What is My Role in Changing the System? A New Model of Responsibility for Structural Injustice by Zheng, Robin
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Papers in Women's and Gender Studies Women's and Gender Studies Program 
2018 
What is My Role in Changing the System? A New Model of 
Responsibility for Structural Injustice 
Robin Zheng 
Yale-NUS College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/womenstudiespapers 
 Part of the Critical and Cultural Studies Commons, Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, Gender 
and Sexuality Commons, Gender, Race, Sexuality, and Ethnicity in Communication Commons, Human 
Ecology Commons, Inequality and Stratification Commons, Other Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies 
Commons, Politics and Social Change Commons, Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons, 
Social Influence and Political Communication Commons, Social Psychology and Interaction Commons, 
Sociology of Culture Commons, and the Women's Studies Commons 
Zheng, Robin, "What is My Role in Changing the System? A New Model of Responsibility for Structural 
Injustice" (2018). Papers in Women's and Gender Studies. 10. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/womenstudiespapers/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Women's and Gender Studies Program at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Papers in Women's and 
Gender Studies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
What is My Role in Changing the System? A New Model
of Responsibility for Structural Injustice
Robin Zheng1
Accepted: 25 April 2018 /Published online: 12 May 2018
# The Author(s) 2018
Abstract What responsibility do individuals bear for structural injustice? Iris Marion Young
has offered the most fully developed account to date, the Social Connections Model. She
argues that we all bear responsibility because we each causally contribute to structural
processes that produce injustice. My aim in this article is to motivate and defend an alternative
account that improves on Young’s model by addressing five fundamental challenges faced by
any such theory. The core idea of what I call the BRole-Ideal Model^ is that we are each
responsible for structural injustice through and in virtue of our social roles, i.e. our roles as
parents, colleagues, employers, citizens, etc., because roles are the site where structure meets
agency. In short, the Role-Ideal Model (1) explains how individual action contributes to
structural change, (2) justifies demands for action from each particular agent, (3) specifies
what kinds of acts should be undertaken, (4) moderates between demanding too much and too
little of individual agents, and (5) provides an account of the critical responses appropriate for
holding individuals accountable for structural injustice.
Keywords Moral responsibility . Structural injustice . Social roles . Social change
1 Introduction
Very few of us would say that we live in a morally just world. Most of us are deeply concerned
about some issue of pressing importance or other: poverty, unemployment, racial and sexual
violence, or climate change, to name just a few. These are forms of structural injustice.
Structural injustice is highly complex, with multiple causes and without easy solutions. Its
defining feature is that it is not maintained purely through the biased attitudes or malicious
actions of individuals, though such bias and malice undoubtedly exist (cf. Haslanger 2015).
Rather, structural injustice is maintained through the behavior of ordinary decent people whose
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choices are constrained by existing social, political, economic, and cultural institutions. Racial
and class segregation, for instance, is maintained as much by well-intentioned parents seeking
the best school district for their children as it is by bigoted real estate agents or landlords.
What is needed to rectify structural injustice is not (merely) that people modify their
individual actions and attitudes, but that we radically transform an entire complex of
interlocking structures, i.e. the system itself. This task can easily feel overwhelming, all the
more so when we recognize how our everyday activities – the food we eat, the clothes we
wear, the work we perform, the media we consume – perpetuate injustice. Why should I, a
single individual, be held responsible for such sweeping harms? Given my total enmeshment
in the system, how can I be expected to change it? This is the problem of individual
responsibility for structural injustice.
Iris Marion Young has offered the most developed account to date of responsibility for structural
injustices: the BSocial Connections Model^ (SCM). She argues that we all bear responsibility
because we each causally contribute to structural processes that produce injustice. My aim in this
article is to motivate and defend an alternative account that improves on Young’s model by
addressing five fundamental challenges faced by any such theory. The core idea is that we are each
responsible for structural injustice through and in virtue of our social roles, i.e. our roles as parents,
colleagues, employers, citizens, etc., because roles are the site where structure meets agency.
My plan is as follows. I begin in section 2 by introducing the structuralist approach to injustice. I
then present in section 3 the main concepts and key features of the BRole-Ideal Model^ (RIM),
according to which individuals bear responsibility for collectively transforming social structures
because of the social roles we occupy. In section 4, I compare the SCM and RIM against five
desiderata that should be met by any acceptable theory of individual responsibility for structural
injustice. Finally, I address potential objections in section 5. In short, the RIM (1) explains how
individual action contributes to structural change, (2) justifies demands for action from each
particular agent, (3) specifies what kinds of acts should be undertaken, (4) moderates between
demanding too much and too little of individual agents, and (5) provides an account of the critical
responses appropriate for holding individuals accountable for structural injustice.
2 The Structural Turn
I begin with a clarification about my use of the term Bstructural injustice,^ which is grounded
in what I call Bthe intersectionality thesis.^ The intersectionality thesis, born of decades of
work in feminist, critical race, postcolonial, and ethnic studies, is the claim that different
oppressions1 co-constitute and mutually reinforce one another. Its upshot is that we cannot
address one oppression without addressing other oppressions. To truly care about women, for
1 What is an Boppression^? On my view, many things that are wrong with the world – poverty, unemployment,
homelessness, drug addiction, mass incarceration, war, rape, domestic violence, unwanted pregnancy, human
trafficking, forced prostitution, refugee and immigration crises, wage gaps, environmental degradation, climate
change – are what we might call Bfirst-order problems^ (which most would agree are problematic). Insofar as we
do not take their existence to be uncontrollable and inevitable facts of life, however, we typically explain these
with reference to (more contentious) higher-order categories such as racism, sexism, exploitation, imperialism,
homo/transphobia, xenophobia, ableism, and anthropocentrism. The latter are what I will call Boppressions,^ by
which I mean the ways in which certain social groups exercise power over others. Note that not all first-order
problems are best conceived of as oppressions in this sense, though they can certainly be understood as the
products of various, intersecting oppressions. My use of Bstructural injustice^ is thus slightly distinct from though
not incompatible with Young’s, which seems to cover both first-order problems and oppressions.
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instance, one must care about poor women, women of color, LGBT women, and disabled
women; hence one must care about rectifying poverty, racism, homophobia, transphobia, and
ableism. Relatedly, efforts to rectify a single dimension of oppression often do not address – or
can even further entrench – other dimensions of oppression. White women may be oppressed
by men, for instance, but may themselves oppress Black women. Taking intersectionality
seriously thus necessitates the use of some concept to designate the entire complex of
oppressions as a whole (cf. Collins 1990/2000, Bmatrix of domination^). As I shall use it,
then, the term Bstructural injustice^ refers to the sum total of oppressions, and the ways in
which they interact with and compound one another, taken holistically. And I shall take for
granted that the basic intersectionality thesis is correct: if one cares about some pressing social
problem, a sufficiently deep enough understanding of that problem will eventually require that
one cares about structural injustice as a whole.
In what follows, I situate Young’s structuralist approach to injustice in the context of two
broader trends in recent work on responsibility for injustice.
2.1 From Agents to Structures
Traditional theorizing about injustice has been premised on a picture of individual moral
agents bearing responsibility for particular actions because they exercise freedom and ratio-
nality in choosing to act one way rather than another. Recent thinking, however, has been
characterized by a move away from agents to structures, as suggested by the term Bstructural
injustice^ itself. This turn to structure, as it might be called, represents an important theoretical
break from two previous approaches, which I briefly canvass here.
The Baggregative approach^ seeks to understand individual responsibility for structural
injustices in terms of agents’ relationships to collective agents2 – e.g. states, the military,
corporations – that have power to perform actions that individual agents cannot, but are still
relevantly similar in possessing distinctive features of moral agency (see, e.g. French 1984).
Responsibility might then be distributed back down to the individuals of which collective
agents are composed (Collins and Lawford-Smith 2016); alternatively, individuals are said to
be responsible in virtue of their capacities to form a collective agent (Collins 2013; Held 1970;
Isaacs 2011). On the Bindividualist approach,^ the strategy is to identify some independently
plausible moral principle and adapt it in the context of structural injustices: principles of
restitution, unjust enrichment, or complicity (Boxill 2003; Butt 2009; Calder 2010; Kutz 2000;
Mellema 2016) or duties of assistance (Singer 1972).
A Bstructuralist approach,^ by contrast, rejects the conception of the liberal autonomous subject
underlying the traditional picture of responsibility (Haslanger 2015; Lavin 2008; Young 2011). It
highlights instead the way in which social life is characterized by pervasive pressures constraining
the range of agents’ possible actions. For structuralists, the aggregative approach falls short because,
even though collectives are powerful, they still face structural constraints. For example, corporations
operate sweatshops because their profits and viability are threatened when their competitors cut
costs, and governments in developing countries permit them because their attractiveness to foreign
investors – vital for surviving in a global capitalist order – is threatened when they tighten labor
regulations and others do not (Young 2011). Vis-a-vis the individualist approach, structural
2 Another version focuses on social groups lacking full-fledged collective agency but whose members are bound
together strongly enough through shared attitudes, interests, or identities that harms inflicted by some members
reflect on the entire whole (Feinberg 1968; May 1992; McGary 1986).
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constraints explain why agents for the most part do not live up to the stringent demands of these
moral principles: it is not that they are bad or immoral people, but that they are beset by other
pressures – as with the parents trying to provide the best possible education for children destined for
tough job markets. A lucid appreciation of these ubiquitous constraints makes clear that the
structures within which agents make their choices are just as important as the choices themselves,
and that those choices quite often will not reflect what an agent would freely and rationally choose if
she had other options.
The move to structures yields two immediate theoretical advantages. First, it expands the
scope of possible objects of moral responsibility. Rather than merely ascribing responsibility
for discrete events3 (a particular police shooting, say), we can also ascribe responsibility for the
background conditions against which these events take place (anti-black stereotypes, racial
ghettoization, austere economic conditions in which poverty begets crime). Second, it greatly
enlarges the set of subjects that can be considered responsible. Rather than designating and
setting apart some individual or group as Bguilty,^ while exonerating others as Bnot
responsible,^ a structuralist approach can recognize multiple – indeed all – parties that are
implicated. For oppressive structures are perpetuated by the ongoing behaviors of all partic-
ipants, albeit in different ways; they are enacted and re-enacted by sweatshop laborers in
addition to corporations and governments (Young 2011). And they cannot be transformed by
the act of one individual or collective agent, no matter how powerful.
2.2 From Attributability to Accountability
The immediate problem that follows, however, is that we seem to lose our grip on responsi-
bility. When we say that injustice is caused by structures and not agents, are we saying that no
one is responsible? To address this problem, structuralists rely on another key move:
distinguishing between different types of responsibility. In addition to Young, political philos-
ophers have contrasted Bblame-responsibility^ vs. Btask-responsibility^ (Schmidtz and Goodin
1998), Bliberal^ vs. Bpostliberal^ responsibility (Lavin 2008), and Boutcome responsibility^
vs. Bremedial responsibility^ (Miller 2007). In each pair, the latter concept used for structural
injustice is characterized as forward- rather than backward-looking, as politically assigned
rather than discovered, as potentially grounded in factors other than moral desert or causing
harm, and hence as not functioning to allocate blame or punishment.
I have argued elsewhere that these all represent different interpretations of a longstanding
distinction from the moral responsibility literature between the concepts of responsibility as
Battributability^ and responsibility as Baccountability,^ which arise from two distinct sources
of philosophical concern (Zheng 2016). Attributability derives from a fundamentally meta-
physical and action-theoretic problem concerning what actions count as genuine exercises of
agency, because only those can provide legitimate grounds for blaming or punishing a person.
The liability model of responsibility, liberal responsibility, blame-responsibility, and outcome
responsibility thus represent particular conceptions of attributability. Accountability, however,
concerns a moral and political (rather than metaphysical) problem. When a person fails to carry
out a duty, the burdens of redress must be distributed across the community somehow or other;
and it is sometimes appropriate to place burdens on an agent even if it did not result from a
3 This remains necessary and important. Much evil in the world is undoubtedly attributable to wrongful actions
of individuals. But the point is that even without them, existing structural constraints would still generate unjust
outcomes (Haslanger 2015).
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faulty exercise of agency. The social connection model of responsibility, postliberal responsi-
bility, task-responsibility, and remedial responsibility, then, represent particular conceptions of
accountability.
The move from attributability to accountability thus avoids the philosophical difficulties
that beset the aggregative and individualist approaches, which stem from trying to ascribe
attributability for structural injustice. While such accounts are insightful and compelling, they
often remain philosophically contentious because they must establish the traditional conditions
of responsibility: that an agent caused harm knowingly and voluntarily. By contrast, agents
need not meet the high bar required for blame and punishment to bear accountability.
3 The Role-Ideal Model of Accountability
I now propose an alternative structuralist model of individual responsibility for structural
injustice, which I call the BRole-Ideal Model^ (RIM). The core idea is that we are, each of
us, individually responsible for structural injustice through and in virtue of our social roles. Like
the SCM, the RIM does not wholly replace attributability models of responsibility, which
perform important functions in certain contexts. Individuals certainly can be attributively
responsible and hence deserve blame or punishment for (some part of) structural injustice,
but this is usually difficult to establish outside particularly egregious cases; the RIM establishes
that we are all still accountable for injustice even though we are structurally constrained.4
Extensionally, the RIM does not differ from the SCM: just as everyone is inextricably causally
implicated in producing unjust outcomes, so too does everyone unavoidably occupy (multiple)
social roles. Theoretically, however, the shift to social roles makes for a stronger model because
the very concept of Bsocial role^ comes ready-made, as it were, with a suite of features that
make it eminently suitable for addressing structural injustice.
What is a social role? In line with traditional sociological theory (e.g. Dahrendorf 1968), I
define it as follows:
Social role: A social role R is a set of expectations E – predictive and normative – that
apply to an individual P in virtue of a set of relationships P has with others (such that
anyone standing in the same type of relationships as P occupies the same R), and where
E is mutually maintained by P and others through a variety of sanctions.
The expectations are predictive in the sense that they are beliefs about how a person will act
and be (in specific contexts), and they are normative in the sense that they are beliefs about
how she should act and be. The set of relationships with others, which might each be
designated Brole-segments,^ are the definitive elements of the role: the role of Bteacher,^ for
instance, comprises specific relationships with students, students’ parents, the school principal,
members of the teachers’ union, education policymakers, and so on (Gross et al. 1958). For
each role-segment, e.g. Bteacher-student,^ there are distinctive forms of behavior and attitude
that are intelligible and appropriate between parties in that relationship. It is intelligible and
appropriate for a teacher to instruct the student to perform academic exercises, feel concern
when the work is poor, and so on. Conversely, the Bstudent-teacher^ role-segment of the
4 As an alternative conception of accountability, the RIM is in principle compatible with the SCM, that is, wemay be
accountable for structural injustice for more than one reason. However, as I explain in Section 4, the RIM has certain
advantages over the SCM. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify these points.
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Bstudent^ role makes it intelligible and appropriate for the student to ask for assistance with
exercises, request feedback, and so on. These are some of the expectations that constitute the
social roles of Bstudent^ and Bteacher,^ and our expectations of others standing in the same
nexus of relationships will be relevantly similar. Finally, the sanctions in question can be
positive or negative, formal or informal, material or psychological, and imposed by others
from the outside or via the person’s own sensibilities. When our expectations of a teacher are
satisfied or unsatisfied, we might respond variously with grateful phone calls or angry emails,
a BTeacher of the Year^ award or suspension and dock in pay; the teacher herself may feel
pride when her students perform well, and guilt when she worries she has not sufficiently
prepared them for some assessment.
Within sociological theory, two main traditions have explored the idea that social roles are
the interface between social structure and individual agency. While structural-functionalism
focuses on the way roles constrain agency, symbolic interactionism emphasizes how roles
enable agency.
Structural-functionalist (or Bsystem^) theories are primarily concerned with the problem of
social order: how is that societies for the most part hold together as continuously and smoothly
as they do, and in much the same form? (Black 1961; Parsons 1951/1991). Their primary
metaphor is that of an organism composed of head, limbs, organs, and so on functioning
together to ensure biological survival. Role differentiation is what makes it possible for the
assorted members of a society to carry out, in a structured and coordinated way, all the
functions necessary for society to sustain itself. On this view, social structures are maintained
through interlinked processes of socialization (internalization of system requirements) and
sanctions (which are positive when behavior conforms to expectations and negative when it
deviates) that keep people in their respective roles. Viewed as an organic whole, society thus
functions as a boundary-maintaining system: when some people deviate from their roles, the
rest of the system works to restore order, just as a homeostatic organism works to maintain a
constant temperature, blood flow, and so on.
According to the RIM, then, individuals are responsible in the accountability sense for
fulfilling their social roles, where the expectations of each role spells out certain duties to be
performed and certain sanctions to be incurred in the event of non-performance. Moreover, it is
through performing a social role that an individual (together with others) enacts structure. This
marks an important difference between the SCM and the RIM. On the SCM, individuals are
responsible for unjust outcomes because of their causal contributions to structural processes.
By contrast, the RIM maintains that individuals are responsible because their role perfor-
mances are what constitute unjust structures. This distinction between causation and constitu-
tion is subtle, but important. On the SCM, individuals can try to avoid responsibility by
denying that they have any backward-looking causal connections or forward-looking ability to
control structural processes. On the RIM, by contrast, whether an individual’s action makes a
causal difference or not is beside the point: their performance of roles partially constitutes the
unjust structure. Therefore that individual is accountable (together with others) for that social
structure, and when it is unjust, they appropriately bear the burdens of reforming it.
Although this idea of social roles is simple, their reality is far more complex. This fact is
exemplified by theories of symbolic interactionism. The idea, put simply, is that social
structures are built up from micro-level interpersonal interactions which are continually nego-
tiated, enacted, and re-enacted (see, e.g. Goffman 1959). Recall that a social role is built up of
different expectations compiled from its role-segments. These expectations never fully specify
in complete detail exactly what the occupier is supposed to do, and expectations from different
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(or within) role-segments never perfectly overlap; roles are thus in some sense essentially
indefinable. Because Broles^ by definition must be such as to allow different individuals to
occupy the same role, there is a limit to how much content can be built into the role: it cannot
require that some role-defining task R be performed only by doing A, B, and C because it must
be possible for others occupying the same role in different circumstances and with different
abilities to achieve R through alternative means X, Y, or Z.5 Performing a role, then, is an
ongoing process of making infinitely many tiny decisions about how to perform it, thereby
calibrating one’s behavior with another’s expectations and behavior at the same time that the
other is calibrating their expectations and behavior with yours (cf. MacIntyre 1999). While
expectations stabilize over time into familiar roles, they must also be renewed with each new
iteration. Equally important to the RIM, then, is the concept of a role-ideal:
Role-Ideal: For every social role R occupied by an individual P, a role-ideal is P’s
interpretation of how she could best satisfy the expectations constituting R (based on P’s
own beliefs, values, commitments, abilities, and lived experience).
In other words, a role-ideal is P’s personal conception of what makes a good R. Role-ideals
are importantly different from social roles because the content of social roles is in large part
intersubjectively shared, whereas role-ideals can vary greatly from person to person. While M
may believe that a good teacher maintains clear and professional boundaries with students,
takes attendance, and adheres to a well-defined agenda, N may believe that a good teacher
behaves Blike one of the guys,^ swaps jokes and anecdotes with students, and is lenient about
absences. M and N may construct different role-ideals because they have different pedagogical
priorities, or because they possess different social identities (e.g. gender, age, nationality) that
raise different student-facing challenges.
Social roles come in many types, and every individual occupies multiple roles at any given
time (Dahrendorf 1968; Parsons 1951/1991). They may be Bspecific,^ in the sense that they are
bound to relatively short-lived and circumscribed contexts, like Bbystander^ or Bbus rider,^ or
they may be Bdiffuse,^ in the sense that they govern all contexts, like Bwoman^ or BMuslim.^
They may be Bascribed^ on the basis of what one is, as in categories defined by race and age, or
they may be Bachieved^ as a result of what one does, as with professor or rock climber. And
they may be Bformal^ roles possessing explicit, institutionalized expectations, or they may not,
in which case they are Binformal.^ This flexibility and multiplicity of roles, combined with their
indefinability, make it impossible to predict how a given person will act in negotiating the
specific combination of roles they occupy. But individuals are typically highly motivated to act
in accordance with at least some of their role-ideals. When a person identifies with a role
(usually through socialization) it becomes intrinsically gratifying to satisfy role expectations;
this is part of what enables roles to preserve social structure (Dahrendorf 1968; Parsons 1951/
1991). On the RIM, it is this simultaneous psychological and normative force of role-ideals that
connects individual agency to social structure in such a way as to ground moral responsibility.
4 Five Desiderata: The SCM vs. RIM
Like Young’s SCM, the Role-Ideal Model (RIM) is a structuralist approach that locates the
wrongs of structural injustice in structures, rather than individual agents; and like the SCM, the
5 I am indebted to Erin Taylor for this point.
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type of responsibility in question is accountability rather than attributability. However, the RIM
differs in a number of key respects. Here, I break down the problem into five practical questions
corresponding to distinct theoretical challenges for which any acceptable model should provide
answers, and I use them to illustrate the differences between Young’s SCM and the RIM.
4.1 The Question of Social Change: How Can My Actions Produce Structural
Change?
An acceptable model must clearly explain how individual agency impacts social
structure. Responsibility requires agency. But the more that structures are thought to
determine individuals’ choices, the less agency they seem to possess. Moreover,
responsibility also requires ability: one cannot be responsible for something that one
simply isn’t able to perform. Yet structural injustice cannot be undone through the
actions of any particular agent.
The SCM addresses the ability requirement by stating explicitly that the responsibility in
question can only be discharged through collective action. What individuals are responsible
for – what is within their ability – is Bjoining with others to organize collective action^
(Young 2011). Individuals are capable of educating themselves, persuading others to act,
and so on. However, the SCM does not yet fully explain how it is that these actions might
generate structural transformation. Young has surprisingly little to say on the subject, more
or less summed up in the following sentence: BSocial change requires first taking special
efforts to make a break in [structural] processes, by engaging in public discussions that
reflect on their workings, publicizing the harms that come to persons who are disadvantaged
by them, and criticizing powerful agents who encourage the injustices or at least allow them
to happen^ (Young 2011). In essence, her picture is one of pressuring powerful agents. But,
as noted earlier, powerful agents also face structural constraints, and no agent, however
powerful, is singlehandedly capable of transforming the structures within which it acts.
While this model represents one important way in which social change occurs, then, it has
limitations and remains somewhat individualist in its scope. A truly structuralist approach
should envisage other ways of pressuring the system.
The RIM tackles the problem of social change head on, though this may seem counterin-
tuitive, since it might be thought that social roles are precisely the problem, i.e. the reason why
structural injustice persists. Indeed, structural-functionalism has been criticized as an inherently
conservative theory that came to prominence during the 1950s and 1960s through its insistence
on the necessity and desirability of social conformity against resistance movements seeking
radical change (Connell 1979). Young herself points out that existing roles serve to preserve an
unjust systemwhile rationalizing individuals’maintenance of the status quo. She thus explicitly
rejects the idea that responsibility for injustice is grounded in social roles, proposing that it is
instead a Bresponsibility in general as [participants of social processes]^ (Young 2011).
Yet I believe that the concept of social roles – the site where structure meets agency – is
too important to jettison. Structural-functionalism provides crucial insights into the immense
challenge of radical, wholesale structural transformation. What has become apparent through
the twentieth century is that even drastic changes in one sub-system (e.g. political revolu-
tion) typically do not lead to lasting or widespread change if pressures from other sub-
systems (e.g. the global economic order) push back toward equilibrium. To recast the
intersectionality thesis into structural-functionalist terminology, we might say: the problem
is that modifying one sub-system (economic, legal, political; race, gender, class) is merely
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change within the system, but does not constitute change of the system,6 and often
languishes in the face of boundary-maintaining pressures.
Moreover, because social roles maintain structures, they can also be used to transform
them. This transformative potential is most apparent in symbolic interactionist theories of
roles. A key metaphor in the literature is of role as resource (Baker and Faulkner 1991;
Callero 1994). In occupying a role, individuals acquire access to specific resources and
powers. In my role as Bprofessor,^ for instance, I can gain entry into the university library,
request an audience with the dean, inform my students what is the strongest argument
against some view, and so on. I can do these things only because there already exists a
bundle of expectations about what a Bprofessor^ is, such that it is intelligible and appro-
priate for me to act in these ways on these relationships.7
On the RIM, then, structural transformation is made possible when all individuals through-
out the entire system push the boundaries of their social roles, even outside of acute conflicts
involving specific powerful agents. When a professor encourages students to adopt gender-
neutral language or signs an open letter to university administration, she stands in the right sort
of relationship to be addressing these others in virtue of her role. Yet at the same time, she also
pushes its boundaries by attempting to achieve something outside of it: by influencing the way
that others carry out their roles (as students, deans, etc.). In effect, she alters the expectations
issuing from the role-segments of which she is a party, thereby opening up new options by
reweighting the stakes. A sympathetic academic dean who would otherwise be squeezed by
other administrative prerogatives, for instance, has more Belbow room^ (McKeown 2015) to
maneuver when she is backed up by an open letter signed by the faculty, along with student
protests, alumni letters, and media coverage. Similarly, every time a child sees her peers
wearing gender-transgressive clothing or hears her caretakers recounting counter-stereotypical
narratives, she acquires new understandings of what is expected from her by different role-
segments, making it easier for her to challenge gender norms.
The simultaneously constraining and enabling character of social roles, then, provides a
more holistic picture of structural transformation. Social systems are resistant to change,
because different structures work in tandem to restore equilibrium. Instead, pressure must be
applied throughout the entire system, so as to produce either slow, incremental evolution
toward a new equilibrium or else to prepare the way for more ruptural changes (often brought
about by crisis) and enable them to Bstick^. To be sure, radical wholesale transformation
usually does require historical developments on the order of an Industrial Revolution or a
World War that eventually set off major ruptures. But these are rare and cannot be effected at
just any time; moreover, even their transformative power depends on conditions long in the
making – and this is the process to which we are responsible for contributing via boundary-
pushing.8 No theory of responsibility or ethics can mandate or predict what is empirically
needed for transformative social change. (Of course, at extraordinary historical moments, there
6 One might make the Panglossian objection that the overall system already is the best that it could possibly be,
and that current injustices are simply unavoidable tradeoffs. But this is simply defeatism, or complacency –
which we should reject.
7 See also fn. 13 for an example of how a role can be a strategic resource and Bprecondition^ of organizing for
structural change.
8 Enrique Dussel (2008) writes: B[R]evolutionary processes of human history can progress for centuries without
appearing as visible. It is true that one can prepare for and advance the revolution, but only within the limits of
determined time…To believe that a revolution is possible before its time is as naive as not noticing –when such a
revolutionary process has begun – its empirical possibility. History matures with an objective rhythm that does
not necessarily enter into personal biographies no matter how voluntaristically we might wish.^
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will be correspondingly extraordinary opportunities to stretch boundaries in more radical ways,
to abolish old roles, and establish novel ones in service of a new social order.) But the RIM
explicates how and why there are moral claims on all of us at any given time to exercise our
individual agency throughout the system so as to bring about the conditions of possibility for
transformative change. That possibility is located in the social roles we occupy: while social
roles function to maintain structures, the very features that make that possible also render them
into resources for changing those structures.
4.2 The Question of Justification: Why Am I Accountable?
An acceptable model must clearly explain why each and every particular agent is expected to
contribute to structural transformation. Because, by definition, structural injustice is main-
tained by ordinary behavior that would not be wrong in and of itself, justification must be
given for why a particular agent may not simply keep doing as she is doing.
Young recognizes that individuals often avoid responsibility by declaring that it is Bnot their
job^ to address poverty, racism, and so on – it is the state’s job, perhaps, or the job of someone
working for a charity (Young 2011). Given the forward-looking orientation of the SCM,
moreover, it might seem that the burdens should indeed fall on these more powerful agents
with greater capacity for enacting change. In response, Young argues that qualitatively
different contributions are required from different social positions: although governments are
more powerful agents, for instance, they will not act unless pressured by the actions of citizens.
While this reply goes some way toward answering the question of justification, I do not
think it goes far enough. It remains far too easy for individuals to believe that other people can
and should do the work of promoting structural change, and that they are morally in the clear
so long as their causal contributions are not blatantly wrong. If, say, a white, middle-class,
heterosexual, cisgender, able-bodied man does not have any personal stake or interest in
combating these various oppressions, he may agree that these are things that are wrong with
the world but not feel compelled to act on it, so long as he himself does not engage in overtly
prejudiced, exploitative, or biased ways.
The RIM answers the question of justification differently, in two ways. First, as described in
the previous sub-section, structural transformation requires applying pressure everywhere in
the system, i.e. boundary-pushing in all social roles. Second, it is everyone’s job to fight
injustice because it is already their job to perform their roles well. In other words, it is one’s job
not just to be a teacher, but to be a good teacher. This second justification is particularly
important for individuals who do not feel the force of injustice because they are personally
unaffected by it, and who would otherwise try to reject the burden of structural transformation.
To put a finer point on it, it is part of doing one’s job well to strive towards a role-ideal. A
good X, where X is some social role, is one who makes all the (countless, tiny) decisions
required to perform that role in accordance with a substantive role-ideal. Constructing a role-
ideal requires critical reflection on the purposes and aims of the role, how it might be modified
to better achieve them, what auxiliary roles should be created or modified, and how to
collaborate with others possessing similar aims.9 For example, it is simply part of being a
good teacher to ask: BWhat course offerings are we missing? What trends are shaping higher
education today, and what political and economic conditions are affecting my students’ ability
9 See Herzog (2018) for an exemplary analysis of this sort of critical reflection, which she terms
Btransformational agency,^ in organizational contexts.
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to learn? What committees or local organizations should I serve on to address the problems I
see?^ While such reflection is not printed in the formal job description (and of course, many
roles are entirely informal), it goes without saying that a good X must consider such questions.
But – and this is the point – it is also precisely by asking these questions that one pushes the
boundaries of one’s role, and thereby contributes to structural transformation. In other words,
because social structures are built up out of interlinked social roles that together constitute a
stable system, modifying any social role constitutes making some modification (however
slight) to the overall system.10 Whether or not a person acknowledges that present social
structures are unjust, then, occupying a social role makes them responsible for boundary-
pushing of the sort that makes social change possible.
4.3 The Question of Specification: What, Specifically, Am I Accountable for?
An acceptable model must provide specific guidelines as to what sorts of actions individuals
are expected to take. The SCM does well in providing such guidelines. While declining to
stipulate any exact algorithm for calculating what to do, Young identifies four Bparameters for
reasoning^ for people differently-situated with respect to structural injustice. She recommends
that: 1) agents with the power to alter structural processes should try to do so, 2) agents with
privilege, i.e. who benefit from structural processes though they lack the power to alter them,
should use their more ample resources to change their habits and support others’ efforts, 3)
agents with an interest in changing the system, i.e. the victims of structural injustice, should
make efforts to publicize and organize around their plight, and 4) agents in existing organi-
zations with collective ability should strive to direct their membership toward action.
These parameters are very useful. But one might stand in the same relation with respect to
multiple injustices, or in different positions with respect to different injustices. An intersec-
tional perspective takes seriously the variety of oppressions that make up structural injustice, as
well as the ways in which the same agent may be simultaneously perpetrator, bystander, and
victim, and hence possess cross-cutting and different degrees of power, privilege, interest, and
collective ability. Thus it can still feel bewildering to know where to start.
Social roles, however, take us further towards specification because they are rich in content,
which allows them to be action-guiding. For every role, there is some intuitive, salient, and
relatively circumscribed range of associated actions. For instance, merely by understanding
what a Bteacher^ is, we can reasonably expect a person who is a teacher to act on the questions
listed above. We need not, however, expect her to process the thousands of untested rape kits
that wait untouched in hospitals, or to feed homeless people – though there are others
occupying roles in which they are the ones expected either to perform these tasks, create
new roles for performing them, or find people to fill unoccupied roles. By reflecting on the
10 The point here is that on the RIM, every person is subject to claims to act in ways that constitute changing the
system, because every person already enacts a small part of the system in virtue of performing their social roles.
Of course, different roles will differ in the amount of impact they can have on the system, even though it is
trivially true that modifying any role will thereby modify the system. However, every person will occupy at least
one and likely several roles (in virtue of their employment, familial relations, or social identities) that are more
deeply implicated in one or more of the fundamental economic and social relations that generate structural
injustice. Unfortunately, it is certainly the case that roles can be modified in ways that lead to more rather than
less injustice, and there will be substantive disagreement about how and in what direction boundaries should be
pushed in order to perform a role well (see the third objection in Section 5). But it is in virtue of occupying social
roles that everyone is morally required to engage with substantive problems of injustice, i.e. they are responsible
for injustice. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify these points.
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constitutive role-segments of a given role, i.e. the specific forms of power, capital, or demands
to which one is entitled in the relationship through that role, one can carve out a range of
potential boundary-pushing actions. Of course, the nature of actual relationships will differ
greatly, and boundaries are drawn in very different places: merely signaling some political
view with a lawn sign might count as Bpushing it^ in one context (in the role of Bneighbor^),
while marching in the streets to disrupt traffic might be called for in another (in the role of
Bcitizen^). But the act of tending one’s lawn is as clearly intelligible and appropriate for the
role of neighbor as is attending public demonstrations for the role of citizen.
4.4 How Much Am I Accountable for?
An acceptable model must navigate between demanding too much and too little of individ-
ual agents. When we endeavor to truly appreciate the fullness of structural injustice, it can
seem that we would never be able to fulfill all that morality demands, and that our
attempted excuses – personal projects, special relationships, and so on – are just that, in
comparison to the colossal weight of injustice. Yet if we unconditionally protect these
projects and relationships, then the work of rectifying structural injustice can appear merely
optional, rather than required. This licenses complacency and conservatism, and seems
deeply disrespectful to the victims of injustice.
Young acknowledges the specter of demandingness as Ba truth we should pause at^ and she
recognizes that agents can justifiably feel overwhelmed and paralyzed (Young 2011). Her
solution is to stress again that responsibility on the SCM is collectively discharged, and that
individuals are required to join with others – no individual is expected to fix structural injustice
on her own. Moreover, Young is open to considerations of Bwhat is possible and reasonable to
expect^ in order for responsibility to be Bpractically manageable^; one function of the
parameters of reasoning is to prioritize and limit what can be expected of individuals
(Young 2011). As they stand, however, the parameters are silent on just how much of
individuals’ time, effort, and resources should be devoted to discharging their responsibility
for structural injustice. Without some sense of this, however, it is difficult to see what
difference it makes to be responsible or not. Once it is established that I am responsible for
structural injustice, what can I be expected to do differently?
This is where the other features of social roles point in a promising direction. As described
in Section 3, even though roles contain much action-guiding content, they are never fully
specifiable in complete detail; moreover, every individual at any given time simultaneously
occupies a multiplicity of varying types of roles. The indefinability, multiplicity, and flexibility
of roles means that individuals are always at any given moment confronted with the need to
make decisions about how best to approximate their role-ideal(s) and which of their roles to
prioritize in a particular situation. Many different reasons – e.g. ease, efficiency, familiarity,
personal preference – go into the infinitely many decisions that constitute role performance
(and a sizeable number are made without conscious thought). Being accountable for structural
injustice places the demand on individuals to add a further reason into this set: whether and
how one can push the boundaries of one’s role in the right direction. In short, it means
performing all one’s roles with a raised consciousness.
There is a sense in which accountability for injustice is thus extremely demanding, because
one is required to pursue it in all of one’s roles. This is apt, because structural injustice
comprises social structures of all types at all levels, and these must all be transformed: not just
laws and workplace policies, but also gender roles within the family. Yet there is another sense
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in which being accountable is still manageable, because that responsibility is discharged
through work that one is already always performing. Returning to the case of parents choosing
schools for their children, for instance, it might be incumbent on them – in the process of
researching or visiting potential school districts – to include neighborhoods in the search that
they would otherwise have not considered.11 Doing so is part of being a good parent who
recognizes how different social environments afford opportunities for cultivating different
moral values, interpersonal skills, and epistemic capacities in children – and the social
consequences thereof. Of course, the ultimate decision will involve a complex weighing of
all the trade-offs stemming from all the different roles at play, but what the RIM establishes is
that we must as far as possible carry out our roles with consideration of how to do so in line
with role-ideals aimed at structural transformation.
In sum, it is true that performing roles with a raised consciousness is demanding because it
requires time and effort. But performing a role well always requires this kind of time and
effort. For recall that this is precisely what one does in constructing and pursuing a role-ideal:
one critical reflects on how best to perform it. What the RIM claims is just that an assessment
of how Bbest^ to perform the role must include some assessment of whether and how it
contributes to structural injustice. Unlike the SCM, then, which seeks to justify extra-role
burdens grounded in a Bgeneral responsibility for justice^ (Young 2011), the RIM locates these
burdens within a person’s roles – they are burdens that she is already committed to
shouldering.
4.5 The Question of Sanctions: How Can I Be Held Accountable?
Finally, an acceptable model must provide an account of the sanctions licensed by responsi-
bility for structural injustice. Without sanctions, responsibility would be toothless; it would
make no difference whether one were responsible or not.
Young takes great pains to assert that blame and punishment – the traditional responses
associated with responsibility – are not at issue in the SCM. However, the SCM does not offer
an account of what sorts of criticism would be warranted. Although Young distinguishes
between Bblaming,^ on the one hand, from Bcriticizing and holding accountable,^ on the other,
she does not provide further explanation of this distinction (Young 2011).
On the RIM, the question of sanctions is already built into the concept of a role itself, since
to occupy a role just is to be subject to expectations maintained by internal and external
sanctions. As with the SCM, holding agents accountable for structural injustice does not
amount to blaming or punishing them, and hence does not require meeting the conditions for
ascribing attributability; rather, it is (as on all models of responsibility as accountability) to
assign them the burdens of changing that structure. Negative sanctions that are normally
11 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this example. In an article for the New York Times, Nikole Hannah-
Jones writes eloquently of the effects of segregation and gentrification in Brooklyn, N.Y. and her firsthand
knowledge of the life-altering effects of being one of very few Black children sent to a Whiter, richer school
through a voluntary desegregation program in Iowa. She recounts how she persuaded her husband to enroll their
daughter in a low-income public school: BOne family, or even a few families, cannot transform a segregated
school, but if none of us were willing to go into them, nothing would change. Putting our child into a segregated
school would not integrate it racially, but we are middle-class and would, at least, help to integrate it
economically. As a reporter, I’d witnessed how the presence of even a handful of middle-class families made
it less likely that a school would be neglected^ (Hannah-Jones 2016). In my terminology, Hannah-Jones is
pushing the boundaries of her role as Bparent^ by expanding it to include consideration of the effects of her
actions on other parents and children in her community.
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appropriate for addressing suboptimal performance, then, might also be applied whenever agents
fail to do enough to contribute, whenever those sanctions consist of assigning them the burdens of
boundary-pushing. For example, a teacher might be encouraged or mandated by others to diversify
a syllabus, whether or not she is blameworthy for not doing so previously. This sanction is clearly
an appropriate thing to require of a Bteacher^ to improve her performance qua teacher, but
simultaneously one that requires the teacher to push beyond the status quo of what is currently
expected from the role in ways that contribute to greater structural transformation. To take another
example, people are appropriately subject to reminders from others of their role(-ideals), i.e. of the
fact that they should strive to push the boundaries of their roles in ways that contribute to rectifying
injustice. Such role-reminders function to assign the burden of structural change, and are justifiable
without the conditions that are needed for ascribing attributability.12
Psychologically, invoking social roles is likely to be motivationally effective, since people
identify strongly with at least some of their roles. Moreover, the multiplicity of roles occupied
by any given agent affords a variety of options for engaging her in the boundary-pushing work
of structural transformation through some role or other. Rather than accusing a person of
complicity in structural injustice, which is likely to provoke defensiveness, one can instead cite
exemplary role models, organizational mission statements, or other discourses that serve to
prime a person’s role-ideals. Role-ideal reminders, then, are an example of an accountability
practice for structural injustice that is normatively justified and practically effective even where
blame and punishment are not.
5 Objections
Perhaps the most obvious and challenging objection is that some roles are positively unjust in
and of themselves. Isn’t the RIM committed to the counterintuitive claim that people occupy-
ing these roles have a responsibility to perform unjust acts?
Not necessarily. For social roles are, as a general matter, contextually bound. There used to
be chattel slave-owners, but now there are not. There was a time at which there was no such
thing as Belectricians^ or Bweb designers,^ but now there are. It is thus quite an unremarkable
fact that roles enter and disappear from existence in flux with changing institutions, technol-
ogy, culture, and fads. It might easily be the case, then, that to be Ba good X^ in some cases is
to work to bring about the conditions under which Xs would no longer exist. It is not a
contradiction in terms, then, to speak of Ba good slave-owner^ as it would be Ba good
murderer.^ Moreover, we should not underestimate the creative ways in which individuals
can strategically make use of traditionally-defined roles in new and transgressive ways. For
example, women during the Salvadoran civil war (a contingent of which believed that rejecting
traditional domestic gender roles was part and parcel of building a new socialist society) used
their roles as wives, mothers, and daughters to mobilize women’s organizations protesting the
military dictatorship’s economic policies.13 Finally, it is usually the case that the social
12 For more on reminders as a practice of accountability, see Zheng (2018).
13 A representative of the Women’s Association of El Salvador (AMES) writes: BWomen’s mobilizations in
defense of, and in solidarity with, the struggles of men have grown from day-to-day, helping to expose the true
nature of the military regimes. The defense of women’s traditional role, though conceived within a liberal context
and subject to penetration by bourgeois ideology, is a precondition for these mobilizations of women: it is not
easy for the state to repress those who, as mothers, wives, daughters, confront it in the very roles which constitute
a pillar and foundation of domination^ (New Americas Press 1989).
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institutions in which roles are embedded subscribe to higher values that provide resources out
of which individuals can construct role-undermining role-ideals. Even, say, a National Security
Agency (NSA) whistleblower who leaves or Bbetrays^ her role might argue instead that her
actions are in a deeper sense required by the principles that the NSA itself is sworn to protect.
But, one might protest, was it really qua good NSA officer that the whistleblower
acts? Is it not that the boundary-pushing behavior derives from duties attaching to pure
moral agency itself, irrespective of any roles? To this I say: Yes, so it is – and that is
precisely the point. The loyal whistleblower’s actions are an exercise of individual
moral agency – but it is intelligible and morally illuminating to understand her (as
many in such cases commonly do profess) to be doing so through her role, using the
distinctive resources and powers that she claims through it. Thus it is through pursuing
a specific role-ideal that a person uses her agency to reshape structure.
This leads to a third objection. How does one know what Ba good X^ is? There is significant
disagreement on such questions. A Republican might say that a good Bcitizen^ should vote for
Trump, while a Democrat would say that a good citizen should vote for Clinton, and others
would say that a truly good citizen should vote for neither or that Bcitizen^ is a role that should
be rejected altogether.
It is true that the RIM does not itself adjudicate between competing role-ideals. But
it is not the job of a theory of responsibility to issue such judgments: we do not get
answers to such substantive questions for free. A theory of responsibility will not tell
us what our first-order duties are – whether those are to maximize utility, cleave to the
Categorical Imperative, overthrow capitalism, or what – but only the conditions under
which, and the grounds on which, our failing to uphold those duties makes us
appropriately subject to sanctions/burdens. Although it does not provide answers, what
the RIM does is call upon individuals themselves to confront such questions of
structural injustice via reflection upon their role-based duties and ideals, and it fur-
nishes the ethico-political framework within which no individual is allowed to shirk the
requirement of engaging in such substantive disagreements. For such disagreements
generate the potential for structural change. Individuals cannot avoid responsibility for
structural injustice because they each occupy at least one (and likely many) role(s)
whose good performance demands that they consider such questions, and which
requires dialoguing with others. This is what Young, following Hannah Arendt, calls
a genuinely political responsibility (Young 2011): it is political because it requires that
people exchange, entertain, and defend different views about their shared social condi-
tions. In disagreeing over role-ideals, then, one is engaging in politics. But one is doing
so at the point where structure meets agency, such that the individual’s choice of how
to perform that role contributes to the overall project of structural transformation.
Finally, one might object that it is unfair to be assigned a role that one did not
choose, and to be expected to perform it well if one does not endorse its end. Why
should a person care about performing well some role which she did not choose and
does not endorse? The first thing to note in reply is that everyone is bound to care
about some social role or other. Human beings, as Aristotle noted so long ago, are
social animals; they cannot live except enmeshed in social relations. Thus, for which-
ever relations matter most to a person – be they familial, friendly, collegial, or
geographical – there will always be some social role, to which is attached a role-
ideal that that person will be motivated to pursue. And in virtue of pursuing this role-
ideal, that person will have (internalist) reason to engage in transformative work.
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The second thing to note, however, is that being assigned a role logically entails
being expected to perform it well. Such an expectation holds whether the occupant
cares about it or not; even a burger-flipper must form some role-ideal14 according
which the job could be done better or worse, even if she is not motivated to work
toward it. To be sure, some people will not perform their roles well. No theory of
responsibility can guarantee that; indeed, a theory of responsibility is needed precisely
because people will not always act well. And there may be some roles where mediocre
or poor performances simply do not matter, because the roles themselves are trivial. But
it is still simply part of the logic of occupying a role that one is subject to the
expectation of performing it well, and has (externalist) reason to do it well.15 What
the RIM provides is a model of how individual role performance contributes to
structural change.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have defended a new theory of individual responsibility for structural injustice:
that we are responsible through and in virtue of our social roles. I have argued that any
acceptable theory should address the following challenges: describing how social change is
possible, justifying demands on particular persons, guiding action by specifying a range of
options, being appropriately but not overly demanding, and licensing critical moral sanctions.
And I have claimed that the familiar concept of social roles – the interface between structure
and agency – is ready-equipped with all the features we need.
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